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I. Introduction
US combat operations in Iraq in 2003 began with airstrikes on March 19 andswiftly overwhelmed the Iraqi armed forces. Within six weeks, US and co-
alition forces were in control of almost all major cities in Iraq, and Saddam
Hussein’s army was considered defeated. On May 1, 2003, from the deck of the
USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush famously declared that major combat oper-
ations in Iraq had ended.1 His observation that “Americans, following a battle,
want nothing more than to return home [a]nd that is your direction tonight”
proved, however, to be premature. Six-and-a-half years later, 120,000 US troops
remain in Iraq.2 This article examines the legal underpinnings for US-led military
operations in Iraq following the defeat of regular Iraqi military forces.
International law reflects a number of legal bases on which a State may under-
take military operations in foreign territory. The most common legal grounds in-
clude a State’s exercise of self-defense, the authorization of the United Nations
Security Council and the consent of the foreign State. A further ground, though it
may at first glance appear to conflate issues of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, is found
in the obligations of an occupying State under the laws of war. Each of these legal
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grounds has formed a basis—often in overlapping and interdependent ways—for
the US military operations in Iraq during the past six-and-a-half years.
For purposes of this paper, the US presence in Iraq will be examined in three
phases: first, during the occupation of Iraq, which formally ended on June 28, 2004;
second, the period following the end of formal occupation until December 31, 2008;
and finally, the current period, which began on January 1, 2009, and continues
today.
II. Belligerent Occupation of Iraq (May 2003 to June 28, 2004)
Whether a territory is occupied is a question of fact, namely, whether “it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army.”3 This requirement includes both a
physical and an administrative component: an occupying power must both have
firm physical possession of enemy territory and substitute its authority for that of
the local government in that area. Occupation “extends only to the territory where
such authority has been established and can be exercised.”4
While it may be difficult to establish from public records specific dates on which
particular areas of Iraq became occupied by US and coalition forces, contempora-
neous documents indicate that the occupation of Iraq more or less in its entirety
was established by mid-May 2003. In a letter to the President of the UN Security
Council on May 8, 2003, the US and UK Permanent Representatives to the United
Nations announced the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) “to exercise power of government temporarily.”5 While the word “occupa-
tion” appears nowhere in the letter, it nonetheless made clear that the United States
and the United Kingdom, through the CPA, undertook the role and responsibili-
ties of powers belligerently occupying Iraq under the laws of war. Subsequently, on
May 22, 2003, the UN Security Council, noting the May 8 letter, “recogniz[ed] the
specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable interna-
tional law of [the United States and the United Kingdom] as occupying powers un-
der unified command.”6
The insurgency emerged soon afterward, with attacks directed not only against
US and coalition forces, but against Iraqis perceived to be “collaborating” with the
coalition, emerging Iraqi political leaders, and Iraqi police and military forces. In-
surgent targets included the UN headquarters, the Jordanian Embassy, the Al
Rasheed hotel, power stations, foreign companies and oil installations. The insur-
gents themselves were composed of various groups, including Shia militants, for-
eign fighters with anti-coalition motives, Al Qaeda in Iraq and Iraqi nationalists
(most of whom were Baath Party members). With the exception of the Baathists,
none of the insurgent groups represented or was loyal to the government of
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Saddam Hussein. Their tactics included the use of car bombs, improvised explo-
sive devices, suicide bombs, hostage taking and indiscriminate rocket attacks. In-
surgents often intentionally targeted Iraqi and foreign civilians and evidenced little
regard for civilian casualties when targeting military objects.7
Throughout the time they were present in Iraq, US and coalition forces retained
the right of individual self-defense, that is, the right to use force to defend them-
selves against attacks by hostile forces. US and coalition forces also, however, un-
dertook offensive military operations to combat the insurgency. During the period
of occupation, the basis under international law for these operations derived from
two sources. The first ground stems from the rights and obligations of the oc-
cupying power under laws of war to provide for public order. A second and
supplemental ground was conveyed in the October 16, 2003 UN Security Council
authorization for coalition forces “to take all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”8
Law of War
While the lawfulness of the US invasion of Iraq remains a matter of debate,9 it has
no bearing on the rights and obligations of the occupying US and coalition forces
and the occupied population once that relationship is established. The Hostages
Trial at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg10 affirmed that whether
or not an initial act of invasion was lawful is a jus ad bellum question separate and
legally distinct from the jus in bello rules concerning an occupant’s (and occupied
population’s) rights and obligations.11
Upon recognizing the United States and United Kingdom as occupying powers,
the UN Security Council, in Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003, “call[ed] upon all
concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law including
in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.”
Of the many rights and responsibilities of an occupying power, one of the most
fundamental is the obligation reflected in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,
which reads in its common English translation:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far
as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country.
It has been noted that the authoritative French text of the Regulations refers
to “l’ordre et la vie publics,” i.e., public order and life, whereas the accepted Eng-
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translation not only creates a redundancy, insofar as it is not clear what “public
safety” encompasses beyond “public order,” but, more importantly, omits the so-
cial and commercial aspects related to the broader concept of “public life.” Con-
sistent with the authoritative text, this paper focuses on the obligation relating to
“public order.”
The duty on the occupying power to “take all the measures in his power to re-
store, and ensure, as far as possible” public order reflects both an authorization for
the occupying power and important limitations on its obligation. The duty is to
take affirmative measures to provide order for the population under its control—it
is not permitted to ignore chaos and unrest affecting the public even if occupying
forces themselves can avoid these risks—and this obligation necessarily implies a
corresponding authority to take such measures. That duty is qualified in two im-
portant regards. First, the obligation on the occupying power stops short of requir-
ing a result; the caveat that measures be taken to ensure order “as far as possible”
reflects the recognition that the occupying power may not be able to achieve public
order, even upon dutifully taking all measures in its power.13 Second, measures
taken by the occupying power to these ends must respect local law “unless abso-
lutely prevented.” The duty to respect local law would include domestic provisions
relating to human rights, unless such provisions are displaced by specific rules of
the law of occupation, as the lex specialis, or the occupying power is “absolutely
prevented” from implementing them.14
The Fourth Geneva Convention also addresses an occupying power’s duty and
authority to take measures to address security in occupied territories. As a general
matter, Article 27 states that parties to a conflict, whether in their own territories or
in occupied territory, “may take such measures of control and security in regard to
protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.”15 More specifically,
Article 78 of the Fourth Convention provides that in occupied territory, if an occu-
pying power “considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take
safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to
assigned residence or to internment.”
Article 78 acknowledges the potential threat posed by civilians in occupied terri-
tory to the occupying power; the purpose of internment pursuant to Article 78,
much like detention of prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, is
preventative.16 The Fourth Convention leaves broad discretion to the occupying
power to determine whether internment is “necessary for imperative reasons of
security”; its official commentary notes only that such internment should be “ex-
ceptional” and that internment must be based on individualized threat determina-
tions, not collective measures.17 In practice, “imperative reasons” in this context
have been understood to be distinct from criminal justice standards that require,
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for example, probable cause of past criminal activity or indictment for criminal
prosecution. Article 78 also requires that internees have a right of appeal of the de-
cision to detain them, and periodic review of that decision at least every six
months. As discussed further below, detention operations, undertaken in reliance
on Article 78, formed a crucial part of coalition forces’ counterinsurgency strategy.
In the May 8 letter to the Security Council, the United States and the United
Kingdom affirmed their commitment to provide for public order and security,
noting that they, with coalition partners and through the CPA,
shall inter alia, provide for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq,
including by: deterring hostilities; maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and
securing Iraq’s borders; . . . maintaining civil law and order, including through
encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police
force; eliminating all terrorist infrastructure and resources within Iraq and working to
ensure that terrorists and terrorist groups are denied safe haven. . . .18
The reference in the May 8 letter to “deterring hostilities”—drafted before the
major onslaught of the insurgency—recognizes that hostilities can re-emerge in
occupied territory. Armed opposition to occupation has not been viewed as negat-
ing the ongoing status of occupation so long, at least, as the opposition does not ac-
tually wrest effective control of an occupied area.19
Renewed combat during an occupation requires the occupying power to apply
concurrently two branches of the law of war: the law on the conduct of hostilities
will apply with regard to combatants and civilians taking direct part in hostilities,
and the law of occupation will continue to apply concerning civilians not taking di-
rect part in hostilities.20 Combatants who met the criteria for prisoners of war es-
tablished in the Third Geneva Convention continued to receive the protections
and treatment due to prisoners of war under the laws of war. More prevalent in the
Iraqi insurgency, however, were guerillas or saboteurs who did not qualify as pris-
oners of war and were not entitled to combatants’ privileges.21 Such insurgents
could be detained as civilians under Article 78 of the Fourth Convention and pros-
ecuted for their hostile acts pursuant to existing local law or laws promulgated by
the occupying power.
UN Security Council Authorization
By the fall of 2003, insurgent attacks had become frequent and widespread. In
Resolution 1511 in October 2003, the Security Council expressly noted the terror-
ist bombings of the Jordanian and Turkish Embassies, the United Nations head-
quarters and the Imam Ali Mosque, and the murders of a Spanish diplomat and a
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occurred in the preceding 10 weeks.22 Resolution 1511 also acknowledged the
Iraqi Governing Council’s intent to convene a conference to prepare a new con-
stitution, and called for the CPA to cooperate with the Governing Council and “to
return governing responsibilities and authority to the people of Iraq as soon as
practicable.”23 Finding that security and stability would be essential to accom-
plishing the political goals outlined in the Resolution, the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows it to take actions necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security, went on to “[authorize] a
multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.”24 Coalition forces,
effectively already under the unified command of the United States, became
known as the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I).
The broad UN mandate for the MNF-I provided a legal basis for counterinsur-
gency and counterterrorism operations independent of the authorities in the law of
war. This authorization from the Security Council was not strictly speaking neces-
sary, as a matter of international law, for coalition forces at the time it was con-
veyed, because the coalition had pre-existing and robust bases upon which to
provide for security. Nevertheless, it established the legal framework that would
become of primary importance at the end of occupation the following year.
III. Authorization for MNF-I under UN Security Council Resolutions 1546 et seq.
(June 28, 2004 to December 31, 2008)
On June 28, 2004, the belligerent occupation of Iraq by the United States and
United Kingdom ended as a matter of international law, with the formal transfer of
administrative authority and responsibility from the CPA to the interim govern-
ment of Iraq. While in popular parlance the transfer of authority was heralded as
the “transfer of sovereignty” back to Iraq, under the law of occupation, Iraqi sover-
eignty always remained vested in Iraq—occupying powers are simply administra-
tors of the State until the period of occupation terminates.25
The presence and activities of the MNF-I in Iraq remained sizable and signifi-
cant. During this middle period, the legal bases for US military operations were the
continued authorization of the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, and the consent of the government of Iraq, upon which the UN
authorization was predicated.
UN Security Council Authorization
In anticipation of the transfer of authority to the interim government of Iraq and
the end of belligerent occupation, the Security Council passed Resolution 1546 on
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June 8, 2004. Acting again under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security
Council reiterated the authorization and mandate of the MNF-I, stating that it
shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution
expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the [MNF-I] and
setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism.26
One of the annexed letters, from US Secretary of State Colin Powell, explicitly
notes that the agreed tasks of the MNF-I would entail combat operations, includ-
ing detention operations, to address insurgent and other violent forces threatening
Iraq’s internal security.
The MNF stands ready to continue to undertake a broad range of tasks . . . . These
include activities necessary to counter ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking
to influence Iraq’s political future through violence. This will include combat
operations against members of these groups, internment when necessary for
imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons
that threaten Iraq’s security.27
Consent of the Government of Iraq
Unlike the original Security Council authorization for the MNF-I in Resolution
1511, the extension of the authorization in Resolution 1546 was premised upon the
consent of the government of Iraq. Resolution 1546 noted “the Iraqi request for the
continued presence of the multinational force” in the annexed letter from the
Prime Minister of the Iraqi interim government, Ayad Allawi, which stated:
There continue . . . to be forces in Iraq, including foreign elements, that are opposed to
our transition to peace, democracy, and security. . . . Until we are able to provide
security for ourselves . . . we ask for the support of the Security Council and the
international community in this endeavor. We seek a new resolution on the
Multinational Force (MNF) mandate to contribute to maintaining security in Iraq,
including through the tasks and arrangements set out in the letter from Secretary of
State Colin Powell.28
Resolution 1546 further established that the mandate for MNF-I would be re-
viewed “at the request of the Government of Iraq” or in twelve months, and de-
clared that the Security Council “will terminate this mandate earlier if requested
by the Government of Iraq.”29 Secretary of State Colin Powell separately affirmed
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The authorization of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter and the consent of the government of Iraq would each suffice independ-
ently to provide a basis in international law for the US and coalition military pres-
ence and counterinsurgency activities in Iraq. As a political matter, however, the
two grounds were mutually dependent. It is doubtful that the Security Council
would have continued to authorize the MNF-I without the consent of the govern-
ment of Iraq. Conversely, given the nascent state of the interim Iraqi government,
it is questionable whether its consent alone would have been perceived to be fully
independent and legitimate without the imprimatur of the international commu-
nity for the MNF-I and its actions. As it was, the Security Council mandate for the
MNF-I was annually reviewed and renewed, at the request of the government of
Iraq, through December 31, 2008.31
Consequences of the End of Belligerent Occupation
While in popular and sometimes cynical terminology, the US and coalition pres-
ence in Iraq continued to be referred to as an “occupation” long after June 2004, as
a matter of law the consent of the Iraqi government and the decision of the Security
Council were each independently sufficient to terminate the occupation. First, the
Security Council decision welcoming the end of occupation in Resolution 1546
could itself effect the end of belligerent occupation, given the effect of Security
Council decisions under Chapter VII. Because member States of the United Nations
agree to accept decisions of the Security Council, even where such decisions may
conflict with otherwise applicable international law,32 the decision of the Security
Council that an occupation will terminate is sufficient to make it so as a matter of
international law.33
Second, the consent of the Iraqi government also terminated belligerent occu-
pation, and with it, the authorities and responsibilities that accrue to a belligerently
occupying power under the law of war. Yoram Dinstein has noted examples of
“consensual occupation,” such as the Allied powers’ presence in and administration
of France, Belgium and the Netherlands at the end of World War II with the con-
sent of the sovereign governments in exile. In such “consensual” circumstances,
the established law of occupation, including Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,
was not applied.34
While there have been circumstances in which the military forces of a formerly
occupying power remained in a country after the occupation terminated, such as
in Germany and Japan in the 1950s, in those cases, the purpose of the continued
foreign military presence was primarily to defend the host nation against external
threats.35 The end of an occupation typically presupposes that internal military op-
erations have ceased and, under the law of war, prisoners of war and civilian
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internees must be released. In the post-occupation period in Iraq, however, MNF-I
military operations continued in significant force, and security detentions not only
continued but increased dramatically in volume.
Which legal rules, then, applied to the post-occupation military operations in
Iraq? Secretary of State Powell’s letter annexed to Resolution 1546 affirmed that
the “forces that make up MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act
consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the
Geneva Conventions.”36 This commitment to the continued application of the law
of war failed to clarify, however, which branches of humanitarian law were appro-
priate—namely, whether the situation continued to qualify as an international
armed conflict subject to the full array of provisions under the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions, or whether, given the absence of any conflict between the
United States and coalition countries and the government of Iraq, it had become a
non-international armed conflict, to which Common Article 3 alone among the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions and other customary laws of war applied.
On this question there was no consensus. The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) took the view that the residual conflict between insurgent forces, on
the one hand, and the United States, coalition forces and the government of Iraq,
on the other, constituted a non-international armed conflict.37 Others, including
Adam Roberts, suggested that given the non-Iraqi character of the MNF-I and for-
eign insurgent fighters, and the language of Resolution 1546, the more robust pro-
visions of the Geneva Conventions should continue to apply.38
While the United States did not formally revisit its 2003 determination that the
conflict was of an international character, it generally avoided characterizing the
status of the conflict by pointing to the authorization in the Security Council reso-
lution. This response can be fairly criticized for conflating jus ad bellum issues—the
basis for the use of force, i.e., the authorization of the Security Council and the con-
sent of the Iraqi government—with jus in bello questions of which rules of the law
of armed conflict applied to the conduct of the MNF-I.
In practice, the MNF-I generally continued to apply the more robust rules
applicable to international armed conflicts to its operations in Iraq. During this
period, however, MNF-I’s operations also began to shift from a purely war para-
digm to a law-enforcement paradigm, which fostered cooperation with the gov-
ernment of Iraq and paved the way for Iraqi assumption of security responsibility.
Detention operations, in particular, incorporated law-enforcement elements
within the purview of the Iraqi government alongside the security detentions au-
thorized under Resolution 1546.
The standards and procedures of MNF-I internment operations evolved over
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justice system. The day before the occupation ended, the CPA promulgated a revi-
sion to CPA Memorandum Number 3, which outlined the types of detentions
MNF-I would undertake and the procedures applicable to each type.39 Reflective of
the US reluctance to pin down the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to post-
occupation activities, the revised memorandum was careful to avoid any implica-
tion that the Fourth Convention terms on security internees continued to apply as
a matter of law. Language that appeared in the original memorandum, issued in
June 2003, stating that certain provisions were undertaken “in accordance with”
the Fourth Geneva Convention was omitted. Indeed, the chapeau of the Revised
CPA Memorandum Number 3 stated, “Determining, that the relevant and appro-
priate provisions of the [Fourth Convention] constitute an appropriate framework
consistent with its mandate in continuance of measures previously adopted.”40
CPA Memorandum Number 3 as revised established a review process that
would satisfy the right of appeal provided in Article 78. In addition, juvenile de-
tainees were to be held for no longer than 12 months from the date of internment,
and adult internees held for 18 months were to receive review before a Joint De-
tention Committee, which included Iraqi participation, to authorize further in-
ternment. The revised memorandum also gave MNF-I the right to apprehend
individuals who were not considered security internees but who were suspected
of violating Iraqi law. Criminal detainees were to be “handed over to Iraqi au-
thorities as soon as reasonably practicable,” though they could be kept in MNF-I
custody upon Iraqi request, based on security or capacity considerations. The re-
vised memorandum affirmed that the ICRC would continue to have access to both
categories of detainees, and extended similar access to the Iraqi ombudsman for
prisons and detainees.41
The procedures applicable to both security internees and criminal detainees
continued to develop over the course of MNF-I’s operations in Iraq during this
period. For example, the review procedures for security internees were revised to
allow detainees to be present at their review board hearings.42 Cooperation with
Iraqi authorities also increased, in particular in terms of sharing evidence to facil-
itate criminal prosecutions, and MNF-I and the interim Iraqi government signed
a separate memorandum of understanding concerning arrangements for high-
value detainees held pending prosecution for war crimes or other atrocities.
IV. January 1, 2009 to the Present
In the fall of 2007, Iraq’s political leaders announced that they sought to normalize
the status of Iraq in the international community and bilaterally with the United
States. This entailed foremost seeking an end to the Security Council actions under
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Chapter VII that relied on a finding that the situation in Iraq constituted a “threat
to international peace and security.” In November 2007, President George W.
Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki outlined their approach to these ends:
Iraq requested a renewal of the MNF-I mandate from the Security Council for a final
year, during which time Iraq and the United States would negotiate the details of a
bilateral relationship addressing security, economic, diplomatic, political and cul-
tural matters.43 The results of these negotiations were two international agreements
that entered into force on January 1, 2009: the Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States
Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary
Presence in Iraq (the “Security Agreement”)44 and the Strategic Framework Agree-
ment for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States
of America and the Republic of Iraq (the “Strategic Framework Agreement”).45
The Security Agreement addresses a variety of security and military issues, in-
cluding authorization from the Iraqi government for US combat and detentions
operations, and status provisions for US forces, while the Strategic Framework
Agreement covers political, economic, and cultural cooperation.46 Since the expi-
ration of the UN mandate for the MNF-I and the entry into force of the Security
Agreement on January 1, 2009, the legal basis for the US military presence and op-
erations in Iraq has been the consent of the Iraqi government.
Iraqi authorization for the US military presence and operations in Iraq need not
have been conveyed in a legally binding document—or even in writing—to be
valid as a matter of law. There were advantages, however, to memorializing Iraqi
authorization in a public, binding instrument. First, reducing the terms of the ar-
rangement into such a document ensured transparency as to the terms under
which US forces remain in Iraq. Second, placing the authorization in a legally bind-
ing international agreement rendered it, under Iraqi domestic law, subject to the
approval of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, which enhanced the legitimacy of
the arrangement within Iraq.
Consent of the Government of Iraq
Acknowledging ongoing insurgent and terrorist acts, Article 4 of the Security
Agreement reflects Iraqi consent for US forces’ presence in Iraq and defines the
purpose of their mission: “The Government of Iraq requests the temporary assis-
tance of the United States Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to
maintain security and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of
operations against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and rem-
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This authorization departs significantly in a number of respects from the broad
UN mandate for the MNF-I to take “all necessary measures” to provide for security
and stability in Iraq. The Security Agreement reflects the Iraqi assumption of pri-
mary responsibility for security in Iraq; consequently, the US mission is framed in
terms of “supporting Iraq in its efforts.” Consistent with this approach, the agree-
ment requires that all such military operations are subject to the agreement of the
government of Iraq and must be coordinated with Iraqi authorities.48
Detention operations under the Security Agreement also reflect a significant de-
parture from the law of war detentions the coalition undertook under the Article
78 framework in the earlier phases of its activities. Under a law of war framework,
detentions are conceived of as incident to military combat authorities; under the
Security Agreement, detentions are addressed separately from the authorization to
conduct military operations and are integrated into Iraqi law-enforcement opera-
tions. Article 22 of the Security Agreement addresses two categories of detainees:
the so-called “legacy security detainees,” individuals in US custody at the time the
agreement came into force who had been taken into custody by the MNF-I under
UN authorization, and new captures who would come into US forces’ custody after
the entry into force of the agreement.49
Signaling the end of law of war security internment, the agreement outlines the
three general disposition options for legacy security detainees. Under the agreement,
the government of Iraq is to review the cases of all of the approximately 15,800 legacy
security detainees to determine whom it could criminally prosecute.50 Detainees for
whom Iraqi authorities issued a valid criminal arrest warrant and detention order
are to be transferred to Iraqi authorities for prosecution. Detainees against whom a
criminal case cannot or was not brought must be released by US forces “in a safe
and orderly manner, unless otherwise requested by the Government of Iraq and in
accordance with Article 4 of this Agreement.”51 Such a request by the government
of Iraq for another disposition might include repatriation to a third country. Iraqi
authorities may also request that a detainee remain in US custody pending prose-
cution if Iraqi authorities determine that they do not have the capacity to detain
certain criminal suspects safely and humanely in custody.
Resolving the cases of the thousands of security detainees in US custody has
proved time-consuming and politically delicate. By December 2009, 1,441 legacy
security detainees had been transferred to Iraqi authorities for prosecution, 7,499
legacy security detainees had been released and approximately 4,600 detainees re-
mained in US custody. US forces estimated that disposition of all detainees would
not be complete until August 2010.52 The Security Agreement does not specify a
timetable for the completion of this process, and the requirement that releases oc-
cur in “safe and orderly manner” reflects an understanding that releases will be
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implemented with care to facilitate the safety of the individual and the stability of
Iraqi society. To mitigate security risks, US forces release detainees whom Iraqi au-
thorities determined would not be prosecuted in order of least to greatest security
threat. While many welcomed the end of “indefinite” MNF-I detentions, the re-
lease of these detainees was also criticized as contributing to an uptick in violence.53
Under the Security Agreement, new captures are processed in accordance with
the domestic judicial system. The agreement precludes US forces from arresting or
detaining individuals “except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with
Iraqi law and pursuant to Article 4” of the Security Agreement, which authorizes
US military operations and requires US forces to respect Iraqi law.54 The prefer-
ence is to arrest individuals pursuant to an Iraqi-issued arrest warrant. If a warrant
is not feasible, individuals may be taken into US forces’ custody and must be
turned over to a competent Iraqi authority within 24 hours, at which point Iraqi
authorities determine whether continued detention is warranted.
As during the second phase of the conflict, questions remain about how to char-
acterize the nature of US engagement in Iraq. Given the normalized bilateral rela-
tionship between the two countries, there is little basis for the position that the
conflict remains of an international character. The ICRC continues to view the sit-
uation in Iraq as constituting a non-international armed conflict.55 However, the
government of Iraq has not publicly characterized the state of affairs as an armed
conflict or invoked the state of emergency provisions in its constitution. Moreover,
in its handling of detention operations, it strictly follows a law-enforcement model.
While the United States also has declined to publicly characterize the status of its
activities, US forces remain at all times bound by the rules of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions and other customary rules of the law of war.
Finally, although the United States has not asserted this ground, the possibility
exists—at least in theory—that during any of these phases the United States could
have asserted a self-defense basis for conducting counterterrorism operations in
Iraq against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, even if the government of Iraq requested
that US forces depart. Such an argument would likely require the United States to
determine that the host nation was itself unable or unwilling to address the threat
posed by Al Qaeda as a prerequisite to asserting that intervention without host-
nation consent would be warranted. While the United States has not relied on this
theory, and any such assertion during the duration of the Security Agreement
would provoke difficult questions about compliance with international legal obli-
gations incurred under the Security Agreement, the self-defense basis remains a
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